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Understanding The Carrier-Neutral Market (And Why Revenues Will Pass $40B This Year)

Posted on | by Narola

MTN Consulting has just published a “Market Review” of the carrier-neutral network operator (CNNO) sector. The report assesses the key role that these tower, data center, and bandwidth specialists are playing in the downsizing of the telecom sector. While many telcos are shrinking, the CNNO sector is growing >10% per year. Revenues for the 25 CNNOs we track should surpass $40B this year, and approach $60B by 2020 (Figure 1).

mtnc-cnno revs through 2020

Takeaways from the study include:

  • CNNO revenue growth has been steady around 10-15% YoY for several years, in line with the growing telco (& other provider) need for low cost, carrier-neutral network resources. 3Q17 revenue growth for CNNOs was 13.1% (Telco Network Operators: 1.0%; Webscale Network Operators: 23%).
  • CNNO capex rose 11% YoY in 3Q17, to $3.6B. Tower specialists spent 24% of their revenues on capex, data center specialists over 43% due to higher (and lumpy) investments in developing new sites. Tower providers’ incremental capex in new sites is primarily for small cells. Bandwidth specialists’ capital intensity has been over 50% for the last 5 quarters, due to the influence of new builds (NBN in particular).
  • CNNO capex hit $15B on an annualized basis in 3Q17; the biggest spenders were Equinix, Level 3, Australia’s NBN, Crown Castle, Digital Realty, American Tower, and Zayo.
  • M&A is a big factor in the sector’s growth, but just one. CNNOs are growing organically too, and expanding their business models to require a broader mix of equipment (Crown Castle is looking at edge computing, for instance). Technology-related operating expenses can be quite high, for repairs & maintenance of old plant, and energy costs in particular.
  • Total capex across telecom, Webscale, & CNNO was $355B in 4Q16-3Q17 (Figure 2).

mtnconsulting 3Q17 capex-summ5

The report also assesses CNNOs’ network holdings across four main categories: fiber, data centers, towers, and small cells. Most big operators have assets in multiple areas, and that will increase over time. Tower companies are building small cells, for instance, while bandwidth specialists are extending their fiber routes to small cell sites.

Table 1 provides a snapshot of the infrastructure assets for a sample of the CNNOs covered in this report.

Table 1: CNNO network assets (excerpt)

mtnc cnno1

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Indian Operators Divesting Tower Assets To Raise Cash

Posted on | by Narola

Faced with tough competition and high debt, Indian telecom operators are spinning off their tower assets to investors or independent tower companies to improve their financial situation. The 2016 sale of Tata Teleservices’ tower business (Viom) to ATC, and RCom’s planned sale of its tower unit (Reliance Infratel) to Brookfield are just two examples.

Operators in many other regions have divested towers to raise cash, not just India. This is part of an ongoing trend, enabled by the maturity of independent asset management companies. Such divestments in India, though, come against a backdrop of urgent debt reduction needs. Funding network capex while navigating this transition will be a challenge.

Do operators really gain from tower divestments?

Though operators benefit from a cash influx after an infrastructure sale, the devil is in the details. Tower sales typically come with long-term leaseback arrangements, with pre-determined pricing levels locked in. Operators need to set aside sufficient funds for recurring rental costs.

There have been instances where tower companies have shutdown service to operators following rental defaults; RCom is one case. Since the details of the outgoing rental costs incurred by operators are not revealed, it does question the merit of the tower sale. On the other hand, many towers remain underutilized, and operators see benefits not only from the initial sale but in lower ongoing costs as tower space is shared. It also helps them avoid new tower construction, hence avoiding some capex (all else equal).

In India, mobile operators increasingly are focused on their main telecom business, relying for tower assets on a mix of dedicated private equity firms and pure tower infrastructure companies. Deals continue to happen. For instance, now that Vodafone’s acquisition of Idea Cellular has been approved by the antitrust regulator, Bharti Infratel will likely try to buy Vodafone’s 42% stake in Indus Towers. It’s also possible that, post-merger, Vodafone/Idea’s combined 20,000 towers will be acquired by ATC.

Below are a few cases of Indian operators selling towers, or their holdings in tower subsidiaries. Two are completed deals, one is in progress, and two are still under discussion.

Tower asset transfers are affected directly by the broader services market, and M&A changes at that level. We’re seeing this now in India. Vodafone’s merger with Idea, for instance, set to complete in 1H18, is forcing a realignment of ownership in Indus Towers. RCOM’s hoped-for big payout from its tower sale to Brookfield is now in question, since the RCOM-Aircel merger collapsed. Meanwhile, Jio continues to push aggressively to expand, keeping margin pressure high on rivals.

Mobile market consolidation might free up capital for network expansion

In the wake of heavy competition and high debt, Indian operators are exploring various financial deals, not just asset spinoffs.

The recent Tata Teleservices (TTSL) sale of its mobile arm to Airtel, and Vodafone-Idea merger, may just be a silver lining for the Indian telecom mobile market. Over the next five years, we might see a drop in the number of mobile players from 9 to 5. Such consolidation should be beneficial for operators, which can merge network and spectrum holdings. That would free up more capital to invest in network expansions and upgrades; recently Indian operator capex has dipped. Tata Communications’ capital intensity (capex/revenues) averaged just 9.5% for the last three fiscal years, for instance.

With growing demand for a complex range of new mobile services (including in the IoT space), there is a strong argument that operators shift tower management to independent, specialized companies, and focus on providing better quality of service and coverage. India may soon provide a test for that argument.

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Early Telco Reporters Verizon & Rogers Provide Mixed Signals For Vendors

Posted on | by Narola

The first sizable telcos reported 3Q17 earnings this morning: Verizon and Rogers. Both can point to reassuring bottom line results. For the 9 months ended September, operating & net margins improved year-over-year, as did earnings per share. Rogers’ EPS through September was C$2.66, up 24% YoY, while Verizon’s $2.80 EPS for the same period was up 32% YoY. The results contain some negatives, too; some company-specific, but some illustrative of broader market challenges.

Wireless not always a growth driver

Rogers was an early mover in Canada’s LTE market, and continues to grow its postpaid subscriber base: 8.8M in September 2017, up 3.3% from 3Q16. That 8.8M amounts to roughly 25% of Canada’s population. Wireless revenue growth this year has averaged 5% YoY. The company’s operating margins are reliably in the 40-50% range; in 3Q17, the figure of 47.9% was up a bit from 47.1% in 3Q16. What helps keep the margins high are stable ARPUs and fairly low churn. Rogers’ blended (postpaid + prepaid) wireless ARPU for the year so far is C$61.94, up just under 3% from the 2016 period. Churn in retail postpaid is 1.11% so far this year, down a bit from 1.19% YoY.

Verizon, also a first mover in the US’ LTE market, retains high operating margins in its wireless division: 46.2% for 3Q17, from 44.9% in 3Q16. However, core service revenues are falling: $47.2B in wireless service revenues for 1-3Q17, down 6% YoY. Total wireless division revenues also fell, by a more modest 3.1%. The difference is equipment. Verizon regularly charges more in “cost of equipment” than it books in equipment revenues; that’s not changing. However, Verizon closed the gap significantly in 2017. The implicit loss (or subsidy) from its wireless device sales was $2.4B YTD17, down from $3.1B in 1-3Q16. This narrowing may not be sustainable. New device releases and sales/distribution strategies can often lead to spikes in equipment subsidies.

On the plus side, nearly 95% of Verizon’s subscribers are on smartphones (from 93% a year ago). Churn also remains low at Verizon: for the high value retail postpaid segment, Verizon’s churn was 1.02% so far this year, essentially unchanged from the 0.98% in 1-3Q16.

Cord cutters and OTT

Wireline accounts for about 30% of revenues at Verizon, and 25% at Rogers (over a cable network). Like most big incumbents with fixed access networks (PSTN or cable TV), both offer video platforms combining voice, data & video over an operator-provided CPE. To do this, they’ve invested heavily in network upgrades, workforce training, and sales & marketing over the last 5+ years.

Despite this investment and overall subscriber growth, both operators are reporting net losses in video/TV subscribers. Consumers have far more OTT video options now. Performance over mobile networks often isn’t good (or economical) enough for heavy video users. The incentive to keep your telco/cable-provided Internet service but cancel video is growing stronger.

Rogers’ reported sub losses have been ongoing; its TV subscribers are now 1.75M, down 4% from the prior year. This was worsened due to Rogers’ growing pains with platform development. It spent nearly half a billion C$ trying to develop a proprietary IPTV platform, similar to BCE’s “Fibe TV” platform, before having to write it off. It’s changed strategy, and will now license the Comcast-developed X1 platform.

Verizon’s had more luck with its custom FiOS box. However, it also lost video subscribers in 3Q17. Overall net adds for FiOS in 3Q17 were 59,000: +66K for Internet, +11K for voice, and -18K for video. Margins remain low in wireline, despite some YoY improvement; EBITDA/revenues so far this year in wireline is 21.2% from 17.1% in 1-3Q16. Further, to sustain its wireline business Verizon’s capital spending is higher as a % of revenues: 14.6% so far this year, from 10.9% YTD16.

Overall revenue trends point to caution

The figure below shows recent YoY revenue trends for the two operators. Rogers’ trend is relatively steady; its early lead in LTE and market-leading broadband position has helped with this consistency. The growth rate is just 2-4% per year though.

Verizon’s growth has been negative until recently, held back by weak mobile service revenues. A modest improvement helped push Verizon’s YoY growth to Rogers’ level in 3Q17, +2.5%. Another factor benefiting Verizon’s measured growth recovery is mobile device equipment revenues, up 5.4% so far this year, to 13.5% of corporate revenues.

rogersvz-mtnconsulting2

Even with slow top-line growth, both Rogers & Verizon generate healthy free cash flow in typical quarters, including $3B for Verizon in 3Q17 and C$372M for Rogers in the same period. They have high debt typical of telcos, but interest costs are on the low end.

Verizon capex 13-14% of revenues, selective M&A activity likely to continue

On the capex front, Verizon is big but not hard to predict: its annualized capital intensity has been in the narrow 13-14% of revenues range for several years now. Variations in the past have come from quick buildouts to gain market position. As Verizon and other telcos move to more software-centric networks, these variations will be less common and less extreme. It’s unlikely that we’ll see Verizon’s capital intensity rise above the 15% mark anytime soon. For 4Q17, Verizon will likely spend about the same as 4Q16, plus maybe 1-2%.

Verizon’s capex is constrained not just by revenue growth & software-based expansion, but also the need to reserve capital for spectrum and acquisitions. Earlier this year, Verizon purchased Straight Path and its spectrum holdings for $3.1B; in early 2015, Verizon spent $9.9B for AWS-3 spectrum in FCC auctions. On the company’s balance sheet, in fact, the value of spectrum assets (“wireless licenses”) is now slightly higher than net property, plant & equipment (PP&E, net): $88B v. $87B.

And Verizon has a healthy track record of acquisitions. That includes a recent deal to purchase fiber optic assets in Chicago from WOW. That deal was just $225M and for one metro area, but it’s a reminder that Verizon and other deep-pocketed telcos are constantly considering build v. buy alternatives. That’s more the case now, as a sector of neutral network operators (NNO) has matured.

rogersvz-mtnconsulting1

Rogers’ capex levels are looking up

As part of its 3Q17 earnings release, Rogers added C$100M to its 2017 target capex (now C$2.35B-C$2.45B). That modest change is, Rogers says, due to “strong growth in our wireless segment and the intended investment of those incremental profits to further enhance the quality of our networks”.

Even with that, Rogers’ full year 2017 capex/revenues is likely to settle around 16%, low by its historic standards. That’s down, in small part, because of a slowdown in its “NextBox” service while a new platform is being developed: Rogers is set to launch its white label partnership with Comcast sometime in 2018. An X1 success would mean more capex at Rogers. Comcast and it supplier partners, though, may be the main beneficiaries of this growth. At least initially. If the platform takes off and helps reverse Rogers’ video sub declines – and lift ARPUs – you can expect more investment in the core of the network to keep the cord cutters at bay.

(Photo credit: Bernd Schulz)

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Communications Sector M&A Dominated By Infrastructure In 3Q17

Posted on | by Narola

October’s seen a few mergers already, including Airtel-TTSL, a tower sale by Zain and the long-rumored Sprint-T-Mobile transaction (confirmed yesterday). Some interesting deals came out of 3Q17 too, especially in infrastructure markets.

63 M&A transactions announced, including OTT/cloud deals

The communications services sector saw 63 merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions announced in 3Q17. These deals accounted for a total $17.4B in deal value. Infrastructure targets accounted for 56% of deal value across 13 deals. Crown Castle’s $7.1B purchase of Lightower was the biggest by far, and exemplifies the quarter’s focus on towers, data centers, and fiber networks.

Other infrastructure deals announced last quarter include:

  • Equinix: $295M for Spanish data center provider Itconic;
  • Verizon: $225M for WOW’s fiber optic network in metro Chicago;
  • Iron Mountain: $128M for Colorado-based MAG Data Centers;
  • Keppel DC REIT: $78M for a colocation data center in Ireland, from Dataplex;
  • Zayo: $3.5M for a data center in Colorado.

Several small deals involving fiber optic and related assets were announced without valuation: FirstLight Fiber’s acquisition of 186 Communications; Neural Path-Infinity Fiber; Ufinet-IFX Networks; and EQT Infrastructure-Spirit Communications. Also, South Africa’s Dimension Data Holdings decided to sell its fiber & wireless business to Vulatel; Dimension’s view on the network assets is that they are no longer core to its “value proposition”.

Fixed-mobile-integrated services: 28 deals totaling a modest $5.2B

3Q17 also saw 28 deals targeting fixed and/or mobile service operations: 18 fixed, 7 mobile, and 3 for integrated (fixed & mobile) assets. There were no very large (>$10B) telco deals announced in 3Q17, though several earlier ones are still pending (including AT&T-Time Warner and Vodafone-Idea Cellular).

Two sizable deals in 3Q17 were international in scope: Vodacom South Africa’s $2.6B purchase of a 35% stake in Kenya’s Safaricom, and Omantel’s $846M acquisition of a 10% stake in Kuwait-based Zain. Most other significant deals were domestic in nature, including:

  • USA: Cincinnati Bell-Hawaiian Telecom ($650M, July 10); T-Mobile US-Iowa Wireless (value unknown; Sept. 26)
  • South Africa: Blue Label Telecoms-45% stake in Cell C ($424M, July 27)
  • Hungary: DIGI-Invitel ($164M, July 11)
  • Russia: Renova Group-AKADO ($120M, July 11)
  • Austria: Hutchison Drei Austria-Tele2 Austria ($112M, July 30)
  • Thailand: AIS-CS Loxinfo ($79M, September 14)
  • Australia: Superloop-NuSkope ($12M, Sept. 10)

Lowering network & selling costs (relative to size) are common dominators across most transactions. Some transactions markedly improve competitiveness through more scale or better access to a customer segment; for instance, Hutchison Drei bought Tele2’s Austria operation to jump into a strong #2 overall position in the market, behind America Movil’s Telekom Austria.

OTT/Cloud network operators also buying companies

Notably, Alphabet/Google made five notable acquisitions in 3Q17, Facebook 3, and Alibaba 2. Their targets are spread across a range of sectors, in line with their business scope. Lots of action centered around Artificial Intelligence in 3Q17, something OTT/cloud operators anticipate having a role in their networks. Alphabet acquired two firms in this space: Bangalore-based Halli Labs, and Belarus-based AIMatter. Baidu acquired Seattle-based Kitt.ai, and Facebook bought conversational AI startup Ozlo.

Infrastructure demand rising, or unstable?

With all the infrastructure deal activity in 3Q17, some wonder if this indicates rising demand for basic network assets. Does it suggest a strong growth outlook for the “neutral network operators” (NNOs) focused on neutral operations of towers, data centers and fiber networks?

The sector is growing, to be sure, especially member companies like Equinix with aggressive M&A strategies. Private equity (PE) is driving much of the deal activity in this sector. That was the case with 3Q17’s biggest deal: Crown Castle bought Lightower from PE owners including Berkshire Partners and Pamlico Capital. This quarter, there’s an even more audacious deal underway in the sector, with a PE consortium looking into an $11B Indian cell tower deal. That is motivated, at least in part, by high debt among many Indian operators & tower companies.

Which brings us back to the market outlook. In telecom, PE firms tend to buy, reorganize, and sell assets – they’re generally not in it for the (very) long-haul. Publicly traded NNOs like Crown Castle provide exit opportunities for the PE investors – as it did for Lightower last quarter. The fact that several PE firms are raising big infrastructure funds now is a positive for telecom dealmaking.  Telecom network operators seem almost certain to continue slimming down their asset base in light of weak top-line growth. PE firms will surely be around to pick up some assets when the price is right.

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India’s RCom Under Pressure After Its Failed Merger With Aircel

Posted on | by Narola

Reliance Communications’ (RCom) long-planned merger with Aircel, part of Maxis, fell apart last week in the face of legal and regulatory hurdles. This news comes as multiple operators in India are struggling with debt and declining margins.

Both RCom and Aircel face debt issues and declining revenues

The primary reason behind the planned RCom-Aircel merger was to consolidate and reduce losses. The combined entity would have become India’s fourth largest in terms of subscriber base, and the scale would have (hopefully) enabled both to better manage their debt. RCom’s total debt is roughly INR470B, while Aircel’s is INR200B. Both are also facing revenue declines; in 1Q17, for instance, RCom’s revenues fell by 24% QoQ , while Aircel’s QoQ drop was far worse at 47%.

The merger’s failure opens up a debate on the survival of India’s weaker operators, burdened with debt and some on the verge of insolvency.

Grim industry outlook

Many of India’s operators today are in dire straits, facing high competition and coping with high levels of financial stress. In addition to RCom and Aircel, Tata Teleservices (TTSL), for instance, has a debt burden of INR340B, and is considering exiting the business.

Given the large number of players in the market and the high capital investment needed to compete, more consolidation was always in the cards. Earlier this year, Airtel acquired the India operations of Telenor and its over 40M subscribers, for instance. Vodafone India’s pending merger with Idea Cellular is likely to be completed in 2018, producing a combined entity with ~400 million customers. Vodafone hopes for “substantial cost and capex synergies” from the merger.

After these big deals, the remaining players have fewer options to revive their business. Without a good M&A option, selling assets to raise cash is one option being explored. Spectrum sales may come in handy, but it’s a buyer’s market. In the event of a failure to sustain their business, an operator can be compelled to surrender spectrum (one possible outcome facing TTSL).

Uncertain future for RCom and Aircel

The future for Aircel and RCom looks bleak, as competition is heating up. Most Indian operators are facing the heat of Jio’s September 2016 nationwide launch. Jio’s aggressive pricing, though, has been especially difficult for RCom and Aircel to replicate.

RCom desperately wanted this merger as it was vital for its debt reduction efforts. The merger would have resulted in a combined entity with an asset base of close to INR650B (US$10B) and a net worth of INR350B. This greater scale would have allowed faster debt repayments and a 40% overall debt reduction for RCom by the end of 2017. Moreover, tower companies are pressuring RCom to pay back dues on its tower rental contracts. RCom has to pay American Tower Company and Bharti Infratel about INR200-250M each; and about INR95M to GTL Infra (including its unit CNIL).

RCom had plans for selling the towers of the combined RCom-Aircel entity to Brookfield Asset Management to clear a significant portion of its debt. But with the merger now being called off, the tower deal will have to be reassessed. Brookfield had apparently wanted to buy the combined tower base for up to INR110B. RCom is still hopeful about reviving its business by deploying 4G services, via a spectrum agreement with Jio. It also hopes to monetize its 2G and 3G spectrum and sell some real estate assets. But RCom has a long way to go in growing and sustaining its subscriber base in a highly disruptive mobile market.

Can Jio bailout RCom from this crisis?

Despite Mukesh Ambani, founder of Jio, and Anil Ambani, owner of RCom, denying all rumors surrounding a possible merger, it would not be a surprise if it happens.

In early 2016, the companies entered into a spectrum sharing deal, where RCom sold its spectrum in nine circles to Jio and approved spectrum sharing in another 17 circles; fiber sharing was also involved. By most accounts, the deal was a success for Jio, as it enabled a quick national launch. The deal has brought fewer benefits to RCom, which is now incurring losses and running out of funds for network expansion.

RCom might also be considering a bail out option. In June 2017, RCOM requested government support (through an “inter-ministerial group”) to withdraw the 10% cross holding restriction. This rule states that operators are not authorized to own more than 10% equity in two different operators in the same circle, thus hinting at a possible sale of its equity to operators. Considering its past association with RCom, Jio seems the most likely other operator to buy equity in RCom. And if such a deal takes place, it will provide Jio with greater access to RCom’s towers, fiber and spectrum. Only time can answer if Mukesh Ambani will come to his brother’s aid in bailing him out from this crisis.

(Photo credit: Pablo Garcia Saldana)

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Rising Costs Plague India’s Tata Teleservices As Competition Intensifies

Posted on | by Narola

Tata Group is looking for a clean break

Tata Teleservices (TTSL) has family ties to one of India’s biggest industry groups, but that hasn’t helped it escape the “Jio effect” in recent years.  With just 8.7 million subscribers and a (unified service) license covering only Mumbai and (rest of) Maharashtra & Goa, TTSL has struggled against larger nationwide competitors. Tata Group’s new chairman is now reported to be looking to sever ties with TTSL.

This comes a few months after NTT DoCoMo sold its stake in TTSL back to Tata Sons, consolidating Tata’s ownership in TTSL.

The Jio effect

Reliance Jio has used its nationwide unified license and deep pockets to blanket the country with its new network, and has been pricing and bundling very aggressively. Jio’s push has affected all major operators, but small ones like TTSL have had it especially hard.

TTSL’s license has always limited its growth ceiling. As India’s telecom sector has exploded in recent years, though, TTSL has actually shrunk. Its peak was in March 2011, when it reported 16.9 million subscribers. It now has just over half that subscriber base.

Despite the mobile decline, TTSL’s fixed division has grown recently. While TTSL doesn’t break out details, it does report that wireline grew from 30% of revenues in FY2014-15 to 36% in FY2016-17. Total company revenues have grown a bit (20%) since FY2011, despite TTSL’s mobile user decline and India’s declining mobile ARPUs . TTSL’s wireline business has expanded.

Cost curve has been going in the wrong direction

TTSL’s EBITDA margin (EBITDA divided by revenues) has hovered in the comfortable but not stellar range of 20-30% for each of the last 8 fiscal years (it was slightly higher before that). Despite this operating stability, its net margins (net profit divided by revenues) have been negative for 6 straight years, coming in at -85% in FY2016-17. These steady losses have resulted in high debt, among other challenges.

Finance-related costs main culprit, but network & regulatory also key

While most of the telecom industry faces declining costs, on a per line or per subscriber basis, TTSL’s recent experience has differed.  Focusing just on three fiscal year periods (FY2010-11, FY2013-14, and FY2016-17), the figure below shows TTSL’s costs on a per subscriber basis, in Rupees per year.

MTN Consulting - TTSL costs.png

Five categories are shown. Three are operating (network operations, regulatory-related opex, and the cost of renting infrastructure under sharing agreements), while two are non-operating (net financing costs, i.e. the cost of servicing its debt, and depreciation & amortization, or “D&A”).

In each area, TTSL has faced challenges in recent years.

TTSL’s increase in finance costs have been staggering, and D&A costs have also grown. What’s not shown are results through June 2017 (i.e. 2Q17), when TTSL’s finance costs worsened, to 69% of revenues (from 24% in 2Q16)

Regulatory costs per line doubled from FY11 to FY17. These costs vary by country and the operator’s business model. License fees and spectrum charges are in general high in India. So, the fact that TTSL’s regulatory costs – while they are high – isn’t an immediate red flag. But it hasn’t helped the company.

Infrastructure sharing operating expense (opex) has also risen as TTSL has relied more on other providers for network coverage. One goal of this sharing is to lower capex requirements in the short-term, and eventually also debt. Given TTSL’s ongoing high finance costs, that doesn’t appear to have been successful.

Finally, network operations opex trends at TTSL are unusual. Most operators globally have experienced declining network operations costs over time, due to new technology, greater scale, and other factors. TTSL, though, saw network operations opex (per line) more than double between FY2011 and FY2017.

What might explain the network operations trend? One possibility: TTSL started relying far more on other providers for its infrastructure. Infra sharing costs as a percent of total opex grew from 9.3% in FY11 to 19.2% in FY17. Increased sharing could have resulted in some unexpected internal network operations costs; that’s a topic for further research. Another likely factor is the decline of TTSL’s mobile subscriber base, and a relative growth in fixed operations. Mobile subscribers often carry lower ARPUs, but the cost of supporting them in the network is also lower. That’s not the case for every company, clearly, but TTSL’s recent experience supports this view.